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Introduction
Employment studies sponsored by the 1W during the
1970s clarified the fact that, outside officially recognised
pockets of regular employees, the remaining labour
force was neither idle nor unemployed, but engaged in
a vast variety of occupations and activities under
widely differing conditions of work. The co-existence
of standard, western-type employment along with
other amorphous kinds of work, has been labelled as
the formal/informal sector (IS) dichotomy and has
since been accepted as a general characteristic of the
economies of less developed countries.
Although many countries use an officially recognised
definition of the formal sector (usually in terms of the
applicability of certain laws to activities and organisa-
tions)1, the IS remains an elusive concept, defined in
such terms as particular sections of economic activities
using traditional technology; or those activities organised
on a small as opposed to a large scale; or those
producing goods for local rather than national or
international markets. However, such categorisations
are country specific and can be refuted by counter-
examples. For example, the definition of IS used by
the ILO Kenya study 11W 19721 is unnecessarily
restrictive if applied to India. Even more frustrating,
in the same country, at about the same time, two
authors describing the IS give mutually contradictory
views [Dasgupta 1973, Lubell 197412.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the IS constitutes a
very important part of the economy. In India, even if
the IS is defined to exclude peasant proprietors, it still
employed 66 per cent of the remaining labour force
amounting to over 61 million workers in 1971 1GO!
1978b), with the formal sector employing only 20
million workers. Moreover, a growing proportion of
the increase in the labour force of India since then has
gone into the IS.
In view of this trend, policy-makers concerned with
poverty eradication programmes are increasingly pinning
their hopes on improvements within the IS. However,
because their conception of what constitutes the IS is
'in india, the formal sector has now been defined and official publications
such as the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin GO! 1978al give regular
estimates of employment from time to time,
2Lubell describes Calcutta's IS as 'an enormous reservoir of productive
skills'. While Dasgupta says that 'most of those engaged lin Calcutta's
ISI are workers in unskilled or obsolete occupations'.
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far from clear, prescriptions for such improvements
often fail. Because of the general association of the
formal sector with modern technology for export
markets, repeated attempts have been made to promote
in the IS certain skills, products and markets, but with
little effect on the conditions of workers involved.
It is the contention of this paper that the problem has
been aggravated because it is addressing a null issue.
The IS is a classifying device, not of the economy as a
whole, but of the labour market alone. The formal or
informal status specifies only the nature of the labour
contracts that a worker enjoys, without specifying the
category of activity. In India the formal sector provides
the worker with somewhat better working conditions-
better wages, some security of employment, some
provision for paid leave and against sickness, accidents
or old age, while in the IS, whatever the occupation or
organisation of production, wages are distinctly lower
and there are no benefits of the above-mentioned
kind.3
In principle, formal sector labour contracts can occur
in any kind of economic activity, with certain types of
labour contracts having a better chance of survival in
some activities than others. This article examines the
assumption that economic development necessarily
implies a larger formal sector with concomitant better
working conditions.
The Background
A description of the situation in India helps to clarify
the point. The formal/informal dichotomy is of fairly
recent origin in the country in the sense that, in the not
too distant past, the conditions of all workers were
uniformly poor wherever they were working, although
modern industry was promoted in India over a hundred
years ago, mainly by foreign capital and largely for
export markets. For example, the Calcutta jute industry
was started in the 1860s with little formal employment
for the workers there until the l950s. They were
permanently kept on a casual basis, housed in barracks
worse than cattlesheds, and paid well below the family
wage. This was also true of the coal mines, the tea
plantations and the banking institutions of Eastern
India. In contrast, the patently informal activities in
3Bremen 119761 has rightly pointed out that in india the formal and
informal sectors form a continuum with gradual shading from one
kind of organisation into the other. Nevertheless, the break between
the two is quite noticeable to observers.
India today are neither traditional nor local. Indeed a
large part of Indian exports of modern light engineering
goods are produced by small workshops often under
subcontracts put out by large firms or agents. These
self-employed workers earn less than half the formal
sector engineering workers' wages in the same region
IBose 1973J.
The question then is: what has led to a situation where
some workers get formal contracts while others in the
same region, and even in similar activities, do not?
Over this period, the basic imbalance between labour
supply and availability of investible resources in India
has become even more acute. The Indian agricultural
sector, despite sporadic attempts to modernise it, has
not reached a stage where it can release a substantial
surplus for industrial development. The industrial
development that has taken place with foreign as well
as private and public indigenous capital has never
been sufficient to absorb a significant proportion of
the working population. The registered manufacturing
workers, including those in the extractive industries,
account for not more than three per cent of the total
Indian labour force. Therefore, even today, agriculture
employs 70 per cent of workers and 80 per cent of the
Indian population is still rural, with about 15 per cent
of rural families having no land of their own 1001
1978e 1. In spite of the apparent emphasis on socialisation
of the economy, private ownership of all means of
production including land is deeply entrenched and
access to capital is extremely constricted despite the
nationalisation of the banks. In this situation, the
potential surplus of labour vis-à-vis urban investment
is so large that there is literally no reason why wages
should even reach the replacement cost of labour
supply, and in large segments of the IS it is estimated
that 70 per cent of the workers earn less than is needed
to be at or above the poverty line f Dandekar and Rath
1973 J.
Given this situation, the logical thing to do is to turn
the current debate on its head by examining how some
workers do manage to get labour contracts of the
formal sector type, and the close correspondence
between such contracts and the large scale, probably
foreign- or MNC-owned modern productive activi-
ties.
Logic of the Formal Sector
This article argues that the formal type of contracts
have developed in countries such as India through
factors which arç as much political as economic.
Although India has a long history of trade union
activity in many of the larger industnes, the formalisation
of labour contracts came about in at least some
sections of the economy only after Independence,
when a popular government was elected on the basis
of universal adult franchise. Because these countries
were overwhelmingly poor, their governments had to
take a leftist-populist stance in order to win and keep
popular support. The immediately obvious method to
establish such an image was to win over the support of
the larger industrial and white collar trade unions by
helping them to get some of the advantages of regular
employment or formalisation.
At the same time, large business houses, whether in
commerce or in industry, have always been highly
dependent on the support of the government for
concessions relating to the protection of markets,
supply of cheap credit, reliable and cheap infrastructural
services like power, water supply, transport, etc. To
ensure this support, they are willing to concede some
workers' demands when the workers clearly enjoy the
support of the ruling party. Often, large firms, especially
multinationals, offer concessions to workers in a
paternalistic fashion in order to create a favourable
impression on the general populace who are suspicious
because of the former's association with the ex-colonial
powers. In this, they may be encouraged by the
government who want large-scale business in their
country while maintaining their independent and leftist
stance. The jute industry provides an excellent example;
in 1974, the government granted the industry exemption
from jute export duty worth about Rs 250 crores and
helped it to earn a profit of about Rs 400 crores that
year. It then persuaded the industry to concede to the
workers' wage demands, worth about Rs 9 cro res.
On the other hand, the rights and privileges that
formal sector workers enjoy are neither inalienable
nor permanent but available to these workers only at
the convenience of the employers. The latter can, if
required, reverse to a much less liberal position with
the connivance of the government. In many cases, the
government may be forced by political pressures to
pass laws supporting some workers' claims. However,
unless it lends the workers sufficient support to ensure
the enforcement of those laws, employers can subvert
them.
This process occurred in the textile industries where
the cotton and jute mills were forced by government
direction to provide materility benefits and crèches
for their women workers. As a result, the textile mills
reduced the number of their regular women workers
so as to avoid making these arrangements A large
number of cotton mills then employed those same
women, but on a casual basis on the mill premises. In
the jute industry, when workers, with the support of
the ruling party, got the industry toconcede aseries of
wage settlements in the early 1970s, the latter got rid
of a large number of workers on the pretext of
rationalisation of tasks. The increased work-load on
the remaining workers was so great in a number of
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occupations, that workers themselves had to employ
as their casual helpers some of the retrenched workers,
paying them out of their own earnings. Thus the
actual net wages of neither the retrenched workers
nor those retained were at the officially set levels.
Improvements in working conditions are not necessarily
a result of technological improvements in the industry
concernedthe Indian jute industry, for example,
made some minor efforts towards modernisation in
the early 1950s. Since then it has remained stagnant,
with production fluctuating within a narrow margin.
Yet jute workers' wages, which had shown little change
at the time of modernisation or immediately after,
rose considerably ten years or so later. Nor can
improvements in workers' conditions always be explained
in terms of improved prospects for the industry employing
them. Indeed, instances of such improvements taking
place during an industrial crisis are not unknown in
India. For example, during the late 19f the engineering
industry of West Bengal faced stiff competition in a
shrinking market, yet in 1969 workers got an extremely
good wage settlement with the aid of the Left Front
Government then in power. Indeed, during its term of
office, wages of organised industrial workers rose
much faster than in Maharashtra, although the latter
enjoyed much faster growth of new and more capital-
intensive industrial investment [0011973, 19751.
Political Visibifity
As these examples indicate, government support for a
particular group of workers is not necessarily given on
the grounds of its economic strength, its special skills
or the basic justice of its claims. It is mainly lent on the
grounds of how important the group can be to the
image of a political party and how useful it can be for
mobilising popular support for it. This amorphous
quality of the group can be called its political visibilItya
quality which matters more under a government with
a populist/democratic stance than under one with a
more paternalistic or autocratic character.
A group of workers has to be politically visible in
several senses. It has, first, to be visible to its members
themselves as a group with some common politically
influential identity. For example, during the initial
stages of the development of British-owned industry in
Eastern India, special provisions were made to import
labour from distant, often tribal regions in order to
keep the industrial labour force isolated from the
surrounding population. Such labour proved to be
particularly docile. After Independence the very isolation
of these workers gave them an immediate identity as a
minority group with a long tradition of industrial
labour in that region. This was used to get political
support for their demands.
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Secondly, a group has to be visible to the political
parties as possessing a strong potential for exerting
political pressure; the support given to the group then
depends on the assessment made by the political
parties of this potential. Since political leadership in
India is drawn largely from the middle classes, where
the majority are in white-collar jobs, the wage structure
has over the years been strongly biased in favour of
white as against blue collar jobs.4 The trends in the
1970s were towards holding down factory wages while
granting claims of workers such as teachers, bank or
government employees.
Even more important, the grievances of such a group
have to be immediately visible and appealing to the
public. An indifferent public or an unsympathetic
press can immediately kill the interest of political
parties in a movement. This was the case in 1977-78,
when the porters of Calcutta's wholesale markets tried
to get regular status. Their movement got a very
unsympathetic hearing from the public since it hampered
the retail supply of a number of essential goods such as
potatoes and pulses, and raised prices.
The ease with which a group can feel its identity gives
it a special edge in seeking recognition for its demands.
This is precisely the advantage gained from fonnalisation
by a large production unit in one location. Workers
can form a sufficiently homogeneous group to hold
the employers at ransom, at least for some time, with
their actions creating enough stir to make it difficult
for the political parties to ignore them. On the other
hand, for outworkers, even when working in one small
locality, there is a genuine difficulty of knowing who
their fellow workers are. For example, in Calcutta, we5
located one large slum where by our estimate, 500 or
more women of similar social backgrounds were all
engaged in making similar ready-made garments,
probably on order from agents of the same operator.
They were, however, not only ignorant of the total
strength of the group but could always be set to
compete with their neighbours since they had no idea
of the dimensions of the total demand.
The Handicapped Worker
That workers can occasionally partially overcome
their basic handicap of being in a labour surplus
economy does not, of course, mean that the entire
labour force can succeed in doing so merely by acquiring
group identity and political leverage. Given the basic
Kojiko Taira 19731 has shown that among developing countries
Indian wage differentials between low skill white collar and blue
collar jobs are the highest.
'During the course of a survey of women workers in the unorganised
sector of Calcutta undertaken by the writer and sponsored by the
Indian Council of Social Science Research I cf Banerjee 19791.
imbalance between economic investment and the size
of labour force, the privilege is essentially precariously
earned and temporarily enjoyed.6 With each political
change, the groups that enjoy this privilege change,
but in this perpetual game of snakes and ladders, there
are some who never even start. One such group of
non-starters in India are the women workers, especially
the urban women workers.
The problem is not that women have never been
identified as a specific group: they have again and
again been singled out for differential treatment in the
labour market, as in the example of women textile
workers taking the brunt of job losses through
rationalisation at the time when male workers in those
industries started getting formal contracts. Similarly,
in the unorganised sector, women's occupations are
fairly distinct and are also some of the worst paid
anywhere 1GO! 19791. When occupations pass from
male to female dominance, as in the case of the
workers making hand-made cigarettes (Bi,i) in Calcutta,
the piece rate wage for the work is lowered
significantly.
A recent study showed that discrimination cannot
necessarily be explained through either demand
differentials (ie specific preferences on the part of the
employers) or the women worker's lack of specific
qualifications IBanerjee 19791. With a total tack of
tradition of women's work in the region, the main
difficulty was the rapidity with which they had to enter
the labour force, making it more difficult for them to
forge the necessary identity. Women began to work,
not through a growing sense of women's emancipation
and status, but through desperation born of shrinking
family incomes. Most of them were not only totally
untrained for the labour market in any formal sense
but were also uninformed and isolated enough to
believe that having to work was a personal and temporary
tragedy. This made them more ready to accept work
which immediately yielded an income near their target
rather then giving rational consideration to the relative
prospects of promotion or steady work.
Even in such a desperate situation, women were
willing to forego prospects of a higher income if the
occupations offered them violated the taboos laid
down by society in relation to a particular type of
work. For example, upper caste women in Calcutta
with even less of a family tradition of women's work,
preferred outwork to domestic service even though
the rate of return in the former was somewhat lower.
See Bienefeld in this issue. He places this against the background of a
world economy dominated by multinationals and international trade
and brings out clearly the poverty of the prospects for fast devetopment
towards permanent full employment in any ldc.
However, as far as level of skill and family income
were concerned, they were no different from the
domestic servants who often competed for outwork to
supplement their incomes.
Women appeared in this labour market as a highly
fragmented group with little sense of identification
with others in the same situation. There was, therefore,
no incentive for any political party to take up these
women's cause, despite the marked tendency for them
to be used as pawns in bargains with employers. When
the formal sector male workers were on strike or
lockouts, their women could be relied on to take up IS
jobs to ensure the families' survival. Although
occasionally some women, such as the retrenched jute
workers, or the casual hospital helpers (who had to
pay out an increasing commission in order to get daily
appointments) were bitter about the lack of support
from trade unions or political parties, the majority
were content not to make a public issue out of having
to work.
The Trap
Increasing willingness of women and other desperate
workers to work even on such terms, has been
accompanied by a growing use by large firms of
subcontracting arrangements with small workshops,
the self-employed or outworkers. There is a wide-
spread tendency to see a grand design on the part of
capital, mainly international capital, to manipulate
social and political circumstances in the developing
countries in order to use vulnerable groups such as
women to extract added surplus. Without subscribing
to any such teleological explanation, one can readily
see that, given the initial availability of some particularly
fragmented and uninformed groups of workers, capital
would organise to take advantage of this opportunity.
Using decentralised production methods reduces the
need for fixed capital and is particularly welcome in
cases where the demand for the final products is
temporary or fluctuating, or there is open competition
from many national and international producers.
And therein lies the danger. If, with modern technology,
formalisation was an inseparable part of production,
then there was room for hope that, in the long run,
development itself would bring better working conditions
for more and more workers. But present trends in
technological development show that more and more
production activities can be broken into small, separable
parts and organised on an ad hoc basis in widely
distant locations, with wages such that labour can
never get out of the trap. Even if the production of this
sector is inefficient technically (and economically in
the short run) the flexibility gained will be more than
adequate compensation in the longer run.
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Conclusion
In the labour surplus situation of Ides such as India,
acquiring political visibility is a competitive game
because a decent living for all does not seem feasible.
A favourable political situation can result in gains for
particular groups but it would be short-sighted on the
part of these fortunate workers to regard the gains as
permanent. The simple contest of modern, capital-
intensive, large-scale production methods vs the old-
fashioned, semi-rural, artisan production techniques
is no longer relevant. Technology today offers an
entire spectrum of techniques which, based on the
tremendous improvements in information and transport
facilities, make a whole range of combinations of
production organisations not only possible but profitable
under appropriate conditions of labour supply. Such
technical possibilities combined with the existence of
vast numbers of potential workers willing to work
even at wages well below the subsistence level, can act
as a constant temptation for producers to switch
activites between the formal and the informal sectors.
On the other hand, the labour market is nowhere near
perfect in either sector and the link between wages
and productivity is flexible enough to allow for a
substantial margin for bargaining. Therefore it is in
principle possible for all groups of workers to reap
some benefits by organising group action without an
immediate danger of loss of employment. In the long
run, the security of formal sector workers rests on the
differential between the two sectors narrowing. Rational
self-interest as well as humanitarian consideration
appear to point in the same direction towards greater
organisation of all workers.
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